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I. INTRODUCTION
The presidential elections of recent years have
involved both a significant degree of voter dissatis-
faction with candidate choice' and increased cam-
paign spending.2 In the context of a marketplace
of products, these conditions could be character-
ized as an allocative inefficiency" and explained
by an absence of competition.
4
The First Amendment theory of the market-
place of ideas was most notably articulated in
Abrams v. United States.5 A dissenting Justice
Holmes wrote:
But when men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more
than they believe the very foundations of their own con-
duct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by
the free trade of ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
6
Many scholars have used this language in argu-
ing that the dynamics of the marketplace of ideas
are the same as those found in product markets.
7
1 See Frank Newport, Bush and Gore Evenly Matched on Is-
sues, GALLUP ORGANIZATION, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/
releases/pr001027.asp (Jan. 27, 2001) (finding that 35% of
registered voters surveyed and 22% of independent voters
surveyed felt that there was no candidate running who would
make a good president); see also Frank Newport, Bush and
Gore Maintain Leads for Their Party's Nomination, GALLUP OR-
GANIZATION, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/
pr000113.asp (Jan. 27, 2001) (finding that 28% of adults sur-
veyed for the 2000 election and 40% for the 1996 election
were unsatisfied with the respective Democratic and Republi-
can presidential nominees); Keating Holland, Poll: Gore, Bush
Still Lead in Support for Presidential Nomination, CNN.COM, at
http://www.cnn.000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/01/1 2/
voter.poll/ UJan. 27, 2001) (finding 31% of American adults
surveyed would be unsatisfied with a decision to make Al
Gore and George W. Bush the presidential nominees of their
respective parties).
2 Ruth Marcus, Costliest Race Nears End," Bush, Gore Run-
ning Close: U.S. Campaigns Fuel $3 Billion in Spending, WASH.
POST, Nov. 6, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Marcus] (noting that
campaign spending has been steadily rising for decades).
Using similar reasoning, this comment describes
some of the economic concepts that have been
used in applying the antitrust laws to our product
markets. Next, this comment applies these eco-
nomic principles to the presidential election pro-
cess, an area typically subject to First Amendment
scrutiny. In light of the applicability of these prin-
ciples, this comment proposes measures to reform
our election process and make it a more vigorous
marketplace. Finally, because our antitrust law
provides an analytical construct that explains the
dynamics of presidential elections, this comment
concludes that the analysis used in our antitrust
law should be analogously employed to reform
our election process and scrutinize election legis-
lation under the First Amendment.
II. ECONOMIC CONCEPTS UNDERLYING
OUR ANTITRUST LAW
Generally, our antitrust law represents a value
judgment that higher output and lower prices are
3 PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTrITRUST ANALYSIS:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 7 (5th ed. 1997) [hereinafter ANTI-
TRUST ANALYSIS] (explaining that allocative efficiency occurs
when market forces drive resources away from the produc-
tion of goods that constmers value less and towards the pro-
duction of goods that consumers value more).
4 See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,
MICROECONOMICS 173 (1998) [hereinafter SAMUELSON &
NORDHAUS].
5 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
6 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
7 See Aaron Director, The l'arity of the Economic Marketplace,
7J.L. & ECON. 1, 6-10 (1964) (asserting that the dichotomy
of treatment between property and discussion is mistaken);
see also Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of
Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 42 (1992) (arguing that First
Amendment analysis should be carried over into the analysis
employed uinder the Takings Clause); R.H. Coase, Advertising
and Free Speech, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1977) (asserting that
the markets for ideas and goods should not receive different
treatment).
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socially more desirable than lower output and
higher prices." Antitrust law rests on the assump-
tion that the best way to generate these results is
to preserve competition in our marketplaces. ' To
this end, antitrust analysis is dominated by eco-
nomic theory.' 0 Economic theory focuses on
three variables to assess the competitiveness of a
given marketplace: (1) the number of sellers and
buyers; (2) the level of available information re-
garding price and quality of the product; and (3)
the ease of entry into the market.''
A. Characteristics of a Competitive Marketplace
A market is perfectly competitive when it has:
(1) a large number of producers and consumers;
(2) a high level of information available to pro-
ducers and consumers; and (3) low entry and exit
barriers.12
1. Price Competition
When all three of these characteristics are pre-
sent, they force producers to engage in price com-
petition. 13 Given a large number of producers,
one firm is not able to raise its price unilaterally
without the risk that consumers will take their
business elsewhere.' 4 This risk is increased when
8 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HFRBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAw 117 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter AREEDA & HOVENKAMP]
(explaining that the economic model used in antitrust law is
based on the assumption that high output and lower prices
are socially better than low output and high prices).
9 Id. at 4 (noting that the general goal of antitrust law is
to promote competition).
10 Id. at 118.
11 See, e.g., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 5-6 (ex-
plaining that in a competitive market sellers and buyers are
numerous, consumers effectively communicate their subjec-
tive preferences through the consumption decisions they
make at fully known prices, producers know all relevant
)rices and input combinations, and there are no artificial
barriers to production).
12 See id. Low entry and exit barriers allow producers to
enter the market, compete for consumer business and exit
the market easily.
13 See id. at 7 (explaining that competition generates pro-
ductive efficiency because it creates a dynamic whereby low
cost producers are able to displace high cost producers by
selling at a lower price).
14 Id. at 6, 14 (noting that the existence of numerous
producers prevents individual firms from impacting price).
15 Id.; see also SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at
200-01, 274 (explaining that the invisible hand theory, which
results in. maximization of total social utility, assumes that
buyers and sellers have full information about the price of
goods and services they buy and sell).
there is a high level of price information because
a consumer who is aware of lower pricing produc-
ers is more willing to change producers in the
event of a price increase. ' 5 Low entry barriers also
increase this risk, as potential entrants-firms not
currently in the market-can enter the market
more easily and attract away consumers by selling
at a lower price.16 Because a producer cannot in-
crease profits by raising prices, price competition
disciplines producers to maximize profits by pro-
ducing more output at a lower cost and selling to
consumers at a lower price.'
7
2. Non-pice Competition
These three conditions also force producers to
engage in non-price competition.' A high num-
ber of producers forces individual producers to
respond to consumer preferences or risk losing
consumers to a competitor that is more respon-
sive. ' Non-price product information provides
consumers with a basis upon which to make con-
sumption decisions in the absence of price consid-
erations2 ° A high level of non-price product in-
formation also increases non-price competition
because consumers who are aware of more re-
sponsive producers are more likely to change pro-
ducers, if they find their current producer unre-
16 See ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 18 (explaining
that firms will enter the market and force competitive per-
formance if entry barriers are low); see also SAMUELSON &
NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 160 (explaining how high entry
barriers reduce the pressure to vigorously compete).
17 See ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 6-7 (indicat-
ing that competitive forces generate not only productive effi-
ciency but also allocative efficiency whereby resources flow
away from the production of goods that are valued less by
consumers and toward the production of goods that are val-
ued more by consumers); see also SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS,
supra note 4, at 35 (noting that perfect competition results in
an efficient allocation of resources).
18 See ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, .,upra note 3, at 6 (noting that
consumers articulate their subjective preferences through
the transactions they make); see also SAMUELSON & NORDI-JAUS,
supra note 4, at 46 (noting that consumers consider other
factors besides price in making consumption decisions).
19 ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that
perfect competition caters to consumer tastes); see also SAMU-
ELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 138 (emphasizing that
firms in a perfectly competitive market produce an identical
product).
20 See ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, sulpra note 3, at 9 (noting that
consumer decisions reflect their preferences in addition to
their income); see also SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4,
at 46 (explaining that in addition to price, consumers also
consider information regarding the availability of related
goods in making their consumption decisions).
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sponsive to their preferences. 21 Finally, low entry
barriers discipline the market by making it more
readily accessible to potential entrants who can
provide competition against unresponsive pro-
ducers. 2 Non-price competition disciplines pro-
ducers to maximize profits by responding to con-
sumer preferences.
23
Ultimately, economic theory dictates that the
existence of a high number of producers, a high
level of information and low entry barriers pre-
serve a highly competitive marketplace where out-
put is maximized, costs and prices are minimized,
and productive resources are expended based on
consumer preference.
24
B. Characteristics of an Oligopolistic
Marketplace
A market tends to look more like oligopoly and
less like perfect competition to the extent that the
following conditions exist: (1) a small number of
producers; (2) an imbalance of product informa-
tion favoring producers over consumers; and (3)
high entry barriers for producers.25
21 See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 46 (ex-
plaining that information regarding the availability of substi-
tutes affects the demand for a given product); see also id. at
138 (noting that perfectly competitive producers produce
identical products).
22 ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, suprl note 3, at 18; see also SAMU-
ELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 160.
23 ANTrRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 8.
24 Id. at 6, 14, 18; see also SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra
note 4. at 46, 138, 160, 200-01.
25 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 170-71
(identifying a small number of firms, the existence of inter-
dependence and strategic interaction among these firms,
and high barriers to entry as the three factors present in an
imperfectly competitive marketplace); see also ANTrTRUST
ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 254-55 (describing the elements of
a successful oligopoly to consist of: (1) a small number of
firms; (2) ability of firms to agree and monitor each other's
prices; and (3) ability to exclude potential entrants from
competing in the market).
26 See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 171 (ex-
plaining that oligopoly can result in prices above marginal
cost); see also ANTrrRusT ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 16 (ex-
plaining that an oligopolistic market falls short of monopoly
because there is no single firm with sufficient market power,
but it still results in poor market performance relative to a
competitive market because of the aggregate behavior of the
few firms competing).
27 ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 16 (noting that
an oligopolist may be sufficiently large to unilaterally in-
crease price); see also id. at 255 (explaining that when a few
firms dominate most of the market share, the benefit from
raising product price may outweigh the loss of sales to com-
petitors even in the absence of cooperation among the
1. Price Competition
The existence of one or more of these condi-
tions decreases the incentive for prbducers to
compete with each other on price. 2 6 When a small
number of producers control the productive re-
sources available in a given marketplace, the risk
is reduced that consumers will respond to a uni-
lateral price increase by taking their business else-
where. 27 Furthermore, to the extent that the num-
ber of producers has been reduced, it is easier for
a given producer to monitor the behavior of its
rivals. 28 Using this increased price information, an
individual producer can reduce the risk of losing
consumers to a lower pricing producer by either
expressly or tacitly mimicking the pricing behav-
ior of rivals.29 This denies consumers the opportu-
nity to switch to a lower pricing firm. 31 In addi-
tion, high entry barriers lessen the disciplining
effect of potential entrants on current producers
because they reduce the likelihood that a poten-
tial entrant will enter the market and offer a lower
price.3 ' To the extent that these conditions exist,
producers are not disciplined to compete on
firms); SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 171 (noting
that when there are a small ntmber of firms occupying a
market they must command a sizeable fraction of market
share to survive). This risk is reduced because the choice of
viable producers is smaller.
28 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 171-72 (ex-
plaining that when there are a small number of firms occupy-
ing a given market, each individual firm monitors its rival be-
havior and makes decisions accordingly); see also ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 255 (noting that, as the nunmber of
firms increases, the difficulty of detecting cheating and en-
forcing a coordinated response also increases).
29 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 172 (describ-
ing "collusion" as where two or more firms cooperate by
jointly setting their prices or outputs); see also id. at 173 (ex-
plaining that when oligopolists collude, the market will result
in a price and output monopoly); ANrITRUsr ANALYSIS, supra
note 3, at 253 (explaining that in oligopoly, a firm contem-
plating a price increase recognizes that it is in the interest of
the other firms to follow the increase because, if they follow,
all firms will reap the benefits of a higher price; but if they do
not, the lead firm will quickly return to the original price
thus foreclosing the benefit of the higher price for all).
3" SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 172-73; see
also AN-rrRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 253-54 (explaining
that an oligopolist can instlate itself from the risk of losing
customers by communicating an intention to raise prices in
advance thereby giving it the opportunity to rescind the price
increase if it is not followed by the other firms).
"I See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 171 (ex-
plaining that high entry barriers operate to ensure that the
number of firms in a given market remains low); see also AN..
TRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 259-60 (explaining that the
ability of oligopolists to sustain monopoly profits is contin-
20011
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price.3 2 As a result, producers maximize profits by
decreasing output and raising prices, not by re-
ducing cost. 3
2. Non-price Competition
To the extent that these three conditions en-
able producers to sustain a supra-competitive
price, producers have a heightened incentive to
engage in non-price competition.3 4 By engaging
in non-price competition and responding to con-
sumer preference, producers are able to increase
sales at the supra-competitive price without reduc-
ing that price.3 5 Thus, producers in an oligopolis-
tic marketplace maximize profits by vigorously en-
gaging in non-price competition."
Overall, unlike those in a perfectly competitive
market, conditions creating an oligopolistic mar-
ketplace insulate producers from the discipline of
competition. The result is reduced output, higher
costs3 7 and use of productive resources in a man-
ner that will respond to consumer preference3 8
C. Characteristics of an Oligopsonistic
Marketplace
An oligopsonistic marketplace is the inverse of
an oligopolistic marketplace. 9 It is characterized
by: (1) a small number of consumers; (2) imbal-
ance of product information in favor of consum-
ers; and (3) high entry barriers for consumers.
40
1. Price Competition
The existence of these conditions decreases the
incentive for consumers to offer producers a com-
petitive purchase price.4 1 When there is a small
number of consumers controlling the consump-
tion resources, the risk that producers will re-
spond to a unilateral price decrease by taking
their business elsewhere is reduced.4 2 Further-
more, to the extent that the number of consum-
ers has been reduced, it is easier for a given con-
sumer to monitor the behavior of its consumer
rivals.43 With a higher level of price information,
gent on fringe firms' inability to profitably expand and the
existence of high entry barriers).
32 See SAMUELSON & NoRDHAUS, supra note 4, at 171 (not-
ing that imperfect competition generates prices above margi-
nal cost-the level where prices would be in a perfectly com-
petitive market).
33 Id. at 173 (depicting graphically that producers in an
oligopolistic market produce less output and sell at a higher
price than producers in a perfectly competitive market).
'4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 177 (explain-
ing that oligopolists are more likely to engage in non-price
competition because it is a way to increase business without
affecting the pricing structure); see also ANTIRUSTr ANALYSIS,
supra note 3, at 258-59 (explaining that while oligopolists
could collude on. non-price factors, they have a strong incen-




-47 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 173.
38 AREEDA & HOVENAMP, supra note 8, at 177.
3' See Roger D. Blair &,Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy
and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 297, 308 (1991) [herein-
after Blair & Harrison] (explaining that while oligopoly leads
to collusion on the selling side, oligopsony results in collu-
sion on the buying side); see a/soJames Murphy Dowd, Oligop-
sony Power: Antitrust Injury and Collusive Buyer Practices in Input
Markets, 76 B.U. L. REV. 1075, 1084 (1996) [hereinafter
Dowd] (noting that oligopsony is a buyer side manifestation
of oligopoly); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 299
(describing monopsony-the extreme form of oligopsony-
as a market where there is only one buyer).
40 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 308; see also
Dowd, supra note 39, at 1084-85; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 8, at 299.
41 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 308 (noting that
oligopsony can lead buyers to depress the prices they offer to
sellers by colluding with each other); see also Dowd, supra
note 39, at 1088-89 (depicting graphically how oligopsonists
force prices below competitive levels); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 8, at 299 (explaining that a monopsonist can re-
duce its purchase price by scaling back its purchases).
42 See Blair & Harrison, sn/ra note 39, at 308-09 (noting
that oligopsonists can operate to collectively deny their sell-
ers access to a higher price); see also Dowd, supra note 39, at
1084-85 (describing oligopsony as involving a limited
amount of buyers controlling a significant amount of market
share); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 299. The risk
of losing sellers to other buyers is reduced because fewer via-
ble consumers are available for doing business.
43 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 308 (explaining
that the same dynamics that lead oligopolists to collude on
the selling side of the market can operate on the buying side
of the market to result in buyer collusion); see also Dowd,
supra note 39, at 1085 (noting that a necessary element of
oligopsony is the ability to police the pricing behavior of
other buyers to prevent cheating). See generally SAMUELSON &
NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 171 (explaining that when there
are only a few firms in a given market, they become interde-




consumers can reduce the risk of losing produc-
ers to a consumer offering a higher price by mim-
icking the pricing behavior of rivals.44 This fore-
closes producers from the opportunity to switch
to a higher pricing firm. 45 Additionally, high bar-
riers to entry reduce the likelihood that a poten-
tial consumer entrant will enter the market, in-
crease the demand for the producers' product
and thereby, raise the product's purchase price.46
To the extent that these conditions exist, consum-
ers are not disciplined to compete for producer
business on price. 47 As a result, consumers can
maximize their welfare by decreasing consump-
tion and reducing purchase prices.48
2. Non-price Competition
The conditions of an oligopsonistic market-
place also result in less vigorous non-price compe-
tition among consumers.49 A high concentration
of consumption resources among a small number
of consumers reduces the risk that a consumer
that is unresponsive to producer preference will
lose producer business. 50 Imperfect, non-price
44 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 308; see also
Dowd, supra note 39, at 1084. See generally SAMUELSON &
NoRDHAus, supra note 4, at 171-73.
45 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 308-09 (noting
that oligopsonists can operate to collectively deny their sell-
ers access to a higher price); see also Dowd, supra note 39, at
1084-85 (describing oligopsony as involving a limited
amount of buyers controlling a significant amount of market
share); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 299. See gener-
ally SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 274 (stating
that imperfect information can result in market failure).
46 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 308 (noting that
oligopsonists reduce the price of their purchases by reducing
the quantity purchased); see also Dowd, supra note 39, at 1086
(indicating that an oligopsonist must offer a higher price in
order to increase the quantity provided by its suppliers);
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 299 (noting that a
monopsonist reduces prices by scaling back purchases). See
generally SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 160 (not-
ing that barriers to entry reduce the pressure to compete).
47 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 308; see also
Dowd, supra note 39, at 1084-85; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 8, at 299.
48 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 316; see also
Dowd, supra note 39, at 1084-85; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 8, at 299.
49 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 320 (noting that
oligopsonists can exercise their market power to obtain other
advantages besides a lower price).
5o See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 308, 320 (noting
that oligopsonists can operate to collectively deny their sell-
ers access to a higher price); see also Dowd, supra note 39, at
1084-85 (describing oligopsony as involving a limited
amount of buyers controlling a significant amount of market
product information insulates consumers from
competition because producers who are unaware
of a more responsive consumer are less likely to
change consumers if they find their current con-
sumer unresponsive. 51 Moreover, high barriers to
entry enable consumers to be less responsive be-
cause they make it more difficult and less likely
that potential consumer entrants will enter the
market. 52 High barriers also limit the demand for
the producers' product and thereby, enhance
consumers' unresponsiveness to producer prefer-
ence. 53 To the extent that these conditions exist,
oligopsonistic consumers do not have to respond
to producer preference to maximize their welfare.
Unlike those in a perfectly competitive market,
the conditions creating an oligopsonistic market-
place insulate consumers from the discipline of
competition. 5 4 This results in reduced consump-
tion, reduced costs and prices, 55 and use of con-
sumption resources in a manner that is not re-
sponsive to producer preference.
56
Oligopsony raises antitrust concerns primarily
when it occurs in an input market such as labor.
57
When an input market is oligopsonistic and the
share); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 299-300 (ex-
plaining that monopsony power is market power on the buy-
ing side of the market).
51 See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 274 (indi-
cating that a lack of information regarding the quality of
goods can result in market failure).
52 See id. at 160 (noting that high entry barriers reduce
the pressure to compete).
53 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 320 (noting that
oligopsonists can exercise their market power to obtain other
advantages besides a lower price); see also Dowd, supra note
39, at 1084-85 (suggesting that an oligiposonist's market
power is derived from its significant market share); AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 299 (suggesting that a monop-
sonist's market power is based on its ability to scale back
purchases offered to the sellers). See generally SAMUELSON &
NoRDHAus, supra note 4, at 160 (noting that barriers to entry
reduce the pressure to compete).
54 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 308; see also
Dowd, supra note 39, at 1084-85; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 8, at 299; SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 4,
at 160, 274.
55 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 308; see also
Dowd, supra note 39, at 1084-85; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 8, at 299.
56 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 320 (noting that
oligopsonists can exercise their market power to obtain other
advantages besides a lower price).
57 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 308 (explaining
that when oligopsonists purchase less input, the quantity of
the final good which they produce is also reduced); see, e.g.,
Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 235-36 (1948) (holding that a sugar refiners price fix-
ing of sugar beets was subject to the prohibitions of the Sher-
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consumers of that input use that input to produce
a final product that is sold in a market that is
oligopolistic, the non-competitive forces of oli-
gopsony in the input market and oligopoly in the
final product market combine to make prices in
the final product highly supra-competitive.
5 8
III. APPLICATION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION PROCESS
In applying the economic concepts discussed
above to the presidential election process, there
are two markets involved.59 First, there is the mar-
ket for presidential candidates. In this market, the
producers are the various political parties and the
consumers are registered voters. 60 From the in-
verse perspective, the market for presidential can-
didates is also the market for votes. 61 The produc-
ers are the registered voters and the consumers
are the presidential candidates of the various po-
man Antitrust Act); see also Dowd, supra note 39, at 1093-94
(emphasizing that oligopsony creates the threat of collusion,
which is an antitrust concern within input markets); AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 300-01 (explaining how lower
prices upstream can result in higher prices downstream).
58 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 308; see also
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 300. To elaborate on
the labor example, if a oligopsonic consumer of labor uses
that labor to produce a final good that it will sell in an oligo-
polistic market, the prices in the final product market will be
driven up by both oligopsony in the labor market and oligop-
oly in the final product market.
59 See generally Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 21 (1979) (concluding that an aggregate
blanket license of copyrighted musical compositions, which
gives the licensee unlimited access to thousands of individual
compositions, is a separate product from a license to use one
individual composition).
60 See FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 2000 OFFICIAL
PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS (2000), available at
http://fecweb.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm (last
visited Jan. 18, 2001) [hereinafter 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELEC-
TION RESULTS] (listing the amount of votes each candidate
received by state). See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873,
890-93 (1987) [hereinafter Farber & Frickey] (explaining
that under the economic theory of legislation, the behavior
of legislators, who are motivated solely by a desire to be re-
elected, can be explained by reference to two economic mod-
els-one of which assumes that legislators attempt to in-




63 See generally SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at
115-22 (discussing the relationship between production and
cost).
64 See generally Farber & Frickey, supra note 60, at 890-93
(explaining that under the economic theory of legislation,
the behavior of legislators, who are motivated solely by a de-
litical parties.6 2 The focus of this comment will be
the latter perspective, because it provides a means
to analyze the producers' cost 63 in the second
market: the market for political influence over the
elected president.64 In this market, the producers
are the political parties and the consumers are the
various entities that make campaign contribu-
tions. 65 In light of this second market, the market
for votes can be seen as an input market. 66 Both
markets clear once every four years when citizens
vote.
6 7
In the context of the market for votes, the
means of exchange between voters and presiden-
tial candidates is the exercise of a vote, rather
than an exchange of money.68 Thus, there is no
price competition in this market.69 Because there
is no monetary price associated with the "con-
sumption" of a vote, 7°1 monetary considerations
are not a mechanism upon which political parties
and voters can make exchange decisions. 71 Thus,
sire to be reelected, can be explained by reference to two
economic models-one of which assumes that legislators at-
tempt to maximize their chance of reelection by maximizing
financial backing, publicity and endorsement from special in-
terest groups).
65 See FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, TRANSACTION
QUERY (By CANDIDATE), at http://hemdonl.sdrdc.com/
fecimg/norcansea.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter TRANSACTION QUERY] (searching by candidate name gives
donation transactions by committee, candidate committee
and individual); see also Marcus, supra note 2, at A12 (identify-
ing donors who have given more than one million dollars in
soft money during the 2000 campaign cycle); CENTER FOR RE-
SPONSIVE POLITICS, Top DONORS To POLITICAL CANDIDATES
AND PARTIES REVEALED (2000), at http://www.opensecrets.
org/pressreleases/octl8 00_release.html (last visited Feb. 4,
2001) [hereinafter Top DONORS] (assessing top individual,
organizational and business sector donors). See generally Far-
ber & Frickey, supra note 60, at 890-93 (1987).
66 See generally Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 22 (describ-
ing licenses for individual musical compositions as raw mater-
ials in producing an aggregate blanket license).
67 See U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 1. This perspective high-
lights the reason why a re-vote in Florida would have been
inappropriate. A re-vote would have constituted a second
clearing of the market.
68 See generally SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at
32 (comparing money as a means of exchange and barter
exchange, whereby goods are directly exchanged for goods);
id. at 436 (defining "barter" as "the direct exchange of one
good for another without using anything as money or as a
medium of exchange"); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 145 (7th
ed. 1999) (defining "barter" as "the exchange of one com-
modity for another without the use of money").
69 Id.
70 18 U.S.C. § 597 (1994) (mandating that those who
make expenditures to persons to influence their voting will
be subject to imprisonment for up to two years).
71 See generally SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at
436; BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 145 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
[Vol. 10
Election Reform
the market for votes is capable of being disci-
plined only by non-price competition. 72 In this re-
gard, money is not the resource directly used by
presidential candidates to consume votes. 73 Presi-
dential candidates cannot pay citizens for their
votes.7 4 Instead, the resource candidates use to at-
tract votes-the consumption resource-is suffi-
ciently disseminated ideas and information. Vot-
ers offer their votes in exchange for a candidate's
pledge to pursue certain policies once elected
president.
75
In the market for votes, every registered voter
offers the same amount of input: one vote. 76 It
can be "sold" to a political party on Election Day
77
or not sold at all.78 Thus, there is a high exit bar-
rier for voters in the market for votes because the
productive resources that constitute a vote have
zero transferability to a different use. 79 This con-
clusion is bolstered by the existence of bribery
laws, which prohibit the exchange of votes for
money.s 0
A. Assessing the Competitiveness of the
Marketplace for Votes
1. Number of "Consumers" in the Market
In the 2000 presidential election, the two most
obvious consumers of votes were George W. Bush
and Al Gore representing, respectively, the Re-
publican and Democratic parties. However, an ad-
ditional fourteen presidential candidates ap-
peared on the general election ballot."' Thus,
examining the number of consumers by itself, it
appears there were at least a moderate number of
consumers in the market for votes.
8 2
2. Level of Available Information
As stated earlier, there is no price competition
in the market for votes.8 3 Therefore, analyzing the
level of non-price information available to voters
is crucial, as it provides the only basis upon which
barter).
72 See generally ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 6, 8,
18 (noting that perfect competition caters to consumer tastes
and that consumers articulate their subjective preferences
through the transactions they make); SAMUELSON &
NoRDHAuS, supra note 4, at 46 (explaining that in addition to
price, consumers also consider information regarding the
availability of related goods in making their consumption de-
cisions).
73 See generally SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at
436; BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 145 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
barter).
74 18 U.S.C. § 597.
75 See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER COL,
LEGE REPUBLICANS, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM (2000),
available at http://ucsub.colorado.edu/-curepub/platform.
html (last visited Mar. 5, 2001) (organizing the Republican
Party Platform by topic); ASSOCIATION OF STATE GREEN PAR-
TIES, GREEN PARTY PLATFORM (2000), available at http://
www.gp.org/platform/gpp2000.html (last visited Apr. 7,
2001) (organizing the Green Party Platform by topic).
76 See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960)
(concluding that the conception of political equality stands
for the proposition of "one person, one vote").
77 See generally Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 313
(identifying perishability as a product characteristic enhanc-
ing the likelihood of collusive oligopsony)
78 See generally id. at 316-20 (explaining how a monop-
sonist facing an all-or-nothing supply curve can fully exploit
its monopsony power).
79 See generally id. at 314 (using professional athletes as an
example to demonstrate that supply curves for resources with
low transferability are inelastic); SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS,
supra note 4, at 128-29 (explaining the concept of opportu-
nity cost and how, in a well-functioning market, price equals
opportunity cost).
80 18 U.S.C. § 597.
81 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ADDRESSES AND PARTY
DESIGNATIONS OF 2000 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES ON THE GEN-
ERAL ELECTION BALLOTS (2000), at http://fecwebl.fec.gov/
pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2001)
(listing Cathy Gordon Brown, running as an independent;
Harry Browne, running for the Libertarian Party; Patrick J.
Buchanan, running for the Reform Party, Freedom Party,
Buchanan Reform Party, Citizens First Party, Independence
Party and Right To Life Party; Earl F. Dodge, running for the
Prohibition Party; John S. Hagelin, running for the Natural
Law Party, Independence Party and Reform Party; James E.
Harris, Jr., running for the Social Workers Campaign and So-
cialist Workers Party; Denny Lane, running for the Vermont
Grassroots Party; David McReynolds, running for the Socialist
Party USA and Liberty Union Party; Monica Moorehead, run-
ning for the Workers World Party; Ralph Nader, running for
the Green Party, Green Independent Party, United Citizens
Party and Progressive Party; Howard Phillips, running for the
Constitution Party, Constitutional Party, American Indepen-
dent Party, American Constitution Party, Concerned Citizen
Party, Independent American Party and U.S. Taxpayers
Party; L. Neil Smith, running for the Libertarian Party; Ran-
dall Venson, running independently; and Louie G.
Youngkeit, running unaffiliated).
82 See also Dowd, supra note 39, at 1084-85; Blair & Harri-
son, supra note 39, at 315-16 (stating that a small number of
firms are a factor contributing to oligopsony). See generally AN-
TITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 5-6 (identifying numerous
firms as a factor contributing to a perfectly competitive mar-
ketplace).
8- See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
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voters can make decisions regarding where to of-
fer their votes in an election.
8 4
In Buckley v. Valeo,85 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that, due to the electorate's increasing de-
pendence on television, radio and other forms of
mass media for news and information, "virtually
every means of communicating ideas in today's
mass society requires the expenditure of
money."8 6 Thus, one can measure the level of
non-price information available to voters about
the different presidential candidates by assessing
each candidate's access to mass media. In accor-
dance with Buckley, because mass media costs
money, a given presidential candidate's access to
money is a surrogate for the level of information
available to voters concerning that candidate.
Buckley bridges the relationship between money
and votes. While money cannot be used directly to
consume votes, it is the means by which presiden-
tial candidates access mass media and engage in
non-price competition with each other. Thus,
money is still indirectly the resource used by presi-
dential candidates to consume votes. This conclu-
sion is critical because money is a limited re-
source. Economic theory is a tool used to
maximize the utility derived from limited re-
sources.8 7 As soon as money becomes a surrogate
for a certain type of speech, economic principles
should control the regulation of that speech.
In the 2000 presidential election, the Republi-
can Party candidate, George W. Bush, raised
$191.6 million and received an additional $67.6
million in federal election campaign funds. 88
Thus, he had access to a total of $259.2 million
with which to disseminate non-price information
84 See id.
85 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
86 Id. at 19.
87 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 4-5 (ex-
plaining that the essence of economics is recognizing the ex-
istence of scarcity and determining how to organize society in
a manner that optimizes the effective use of resources to sat-
isfy people's almost limitless wants and needs).
88 CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 2000 PRESIDENTIAL
RACE: TOTAL RAISED AND SPENT, available at http://www.open-
secrets.org/2000elect/index/allcands.htm (last visited Apr.








about his candidacy to the voters.8 9 Al Gore, the
Democratic Party candidate, raised $132.6 million
and received $83 million in federal election cam-
paign funds for a combined total of $215.6 mil-
lion. 90
The next closest candidate in terms of cam-
paign funds was Pat Buchanan. He raised $42.7
million and received $16.6 million in federal elec-
tion campaign funds, totaling just $59.3 million. 9'
Buchanan's entire campaign budget was less than
the amount both major party candidates (George
Bush and Al Gore) received from the federal gov-
ernment.9 2 Buchanan's total was less than one-
fourth of George W. Bush's total and less than
one-third of Al Gore's total.
93
The next two most successful candidates in rais-
ing campaign funds, Ralph Nader and Harry
Browne, only had access to a combined $11.1 mil-
lion for their presidential campaigns.94 Al Gore
had more than this amount of money on hand af-
ter the presidential election had ended.
95
Although the number is slightly inflated be-
cause it does not consider the level of campaign
funds accessed by the other nine candidates, if
these five candidates were the only consumers in
the market, then the top two consumers (George
W. Bush and Al Gore) had access to 87% of the
total available consumption resources.9 6
The televised presidential debates offer candi-
dates an additional opportunity to access mass
media and disseminate candidate information be-
cause they are funded independently from the
money raised by individual campaigns.9 7 Unfortu-
nately, because the Commission on Presidential
Debates ("CPD") 98 requires that participating can-
97 FEC Candidate Debates Rule, 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(a)
(2000) (mandating that the debate staging organization can-
not endorse, support or oppose individual candidates).
98 See COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, ABOUT
CPD: COMMISSION HisTORy, available at http://www.debates.
org/pages/history.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter COMMISSION HIsTORY] (describing the CPD as a nonparti-
san, nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation that finances the de-
bates entirely through private contributions); COMMISSION
ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, NONPARTISAN CANDIDATE SELEC-
TION CRITERIA FOR 2000 GENERAL ELECTION DEBATE PARTICI-
PATION (2000), available at http://www.debates.org/pages/
candsel.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2001) [hereinafter CANDI-
DATE SELECTION CRITERIA] (explaining that the goal of the
debates is to afford the members of the public an opportu-
nity to sharpen their views, in a focused debate format, of
those candidates who have sufficient electoral support to be




didates have poll numbers showing at least 15%
support nationally, only George W. Bush and Al
Gore had the opportunity to participate in the de-
bates. 99 Thus, instead of acting as a mechanism to
narrow the information gap between major and
minor parties, the presidential debates have been
used to widen it.
While it appears initially that there are numer-
ous consumers of votes, by factoring in the level of
available information, it appears the market for
votes is highly concentrated."°0 The number of
consumers retaining a viable amount of consump-
tion resources in the market is extremely lim-
ited.10
3. Barriers To Entry
Significant entry barriers to the market for
votes have obstructed both potential consumer
entrants and smaller current consumers from
meaningfully competing with and disciplining the
two major party candidates. 10 2
a. Product Loyalty and Product Differentiation
After campaigning for months, representing
99 See Leigh Strope, Third Parties Locked Out, 1, at http://
www.gopatgo2000.org/library/default.asp?id=148 (last vis-
ited Nov. 3, 2000) (noting that Pat Buchanan and Ralph Na-
der did not share the debate stage with George W. Bush and
Al Gore); see also BUCHANAN-FOSTER PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN,
DEBATE THE DEBATES, at http://www.gopatgo2000.org/li-
brary/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2000) (noting that the three way
debates between Bill Clinton, George Bush and Ross Perot in
1992 had an average viewership of 90 million people,
whereas the 1996 debates between Clinton and Dole had an
average viewership of 42 million); cf Dalia Sussman, Debate
Over Debates, ABcNEWS.coM, at http://abcnews.go.com/sec-
tions/politics/DailyNews/poll000727.html (last visited Jan.
27, 2001) (finding that 44% of adults sampled felt that Ralph
Nader and Pat Buchanan should not be excluded from the
debates by the "bipartisan" CPD). See generally Brief for Appel-
lants at 10-12, Buchanan v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 112 F.
Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000), appeal docketed, (No. 1:00CVI 775)
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 2000), available at http://www.gopatgo
2000.org/library/brief.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2000) (argu-
ing that selection criteria which deny eligibility to federally
funded third party candidates are inconsistent with the statu-
tory exemption given by the FEC to nonpartisan activities de-
signed to encourage voting).
100 See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568,
571, 578 (1967) (holding that the market for liquid bleach
was oligopolistic where Clorox had $12 million in assets and
of the remaining two hundred producers only eight had as-
sets in excess of $1 million).
1o See, e.g., id.
102 See generally ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 5-6
(identifying low entry barriers as a factor contributing to a
the Green Party in his third consecutive presiden-
tial election, 0 3 and giving a detailed speech about
the Green Party's platform at his post-election
2000 news conference, Ralph Nader was asked,
"Did you in fact cost Al Gore the election ... Did
the 3 percent you got [in Florida] disenfranchise
the 48 percent of the population who voted for
Mr. Gore?" 10 4 In response, Mr. Nader said, "I do
think Al Gore cost me the election."' ° Using eco-
nomic theory, this exchange can be explained by
the concept of product differentiation. Product
differentiation occurs when established producers
(or in this case consumers) possess an advantage
over potential entrants and smaller incumbent
firms as a result of accumulated goodwill. 106 The
effect of this goodwill is to make similar products
less-than-perfect substitutes. 1 7 In the context of
the market for votes, there is no doubt that Al
Gore and Ralph Nader are not perfect substitutes,
in the sense that they would run a presidential
term differently. However, the implication of the
journalist's question that Ralph Nader is not a via-
ble presidential candidate, is less about the merits
of his candidacy and more about product differ-
entiation. l08
A substantial percentage of the voting popula-
perfectly competitive marketplace); Blair & Harrison, su/na
note 39, at 315-16 (identifying high entry barriers as a factor
contributing to oligopsony); Dowd, supra note 39, at 1084-85
(identifying high entry barriers as a factor contributing to oli-
gopsony).
103 Arati Bhattacharya, Nader Makes Third Bid for Presi-
dency, THE BATALION VIA UNIVERSrIY WIRE, Nov. 3, 2000 at 1
(noting that in addition to running in 1996, Ralph Nader was
a write-in candidate in the 1992 presidential election).
104 Ralph Nader, Excerpts from Address at C-Span Post-Elec-
tion News Conference, C-SPAN.ORC., at http://www.c-span.org/
search/index.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2001); see also Shailagh
Murray, Election 2000: Nader's Cause Could Pay for His Spoiler
Role, Consumer Advocate Would Make Enemies if Bush Wins Elec-
tion, WALL ST.J., Nov. 9, 2000, at A17 [hereinafter Murray].
105 Murray, supra note 104, at A17.
106 ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 19 (explaining
that in order to overcome loyalty to current firms, an incum-
bent will have to bear a higher promotional cost); see also
SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 161 (explaining
that advertising can create product awareness and loyalty to
well-known brands).
107 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 453, 161
(noting that a market consisting of a large number of differ-
entiated products serves to discourage potential entrants be-
cause the demand for each of the individual differentiated
products will be too small to sustain an entrant intending to
compete solely on that product).
108 See generally ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 19;
SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 161 (explaining




tion is strongly attached to one of the two major
parties.109 This represents accumulated goodwill
towards those parties."l 0 While the voters repre-
sented in these figures will not necessarily always
vote for their respective party's presidential candi-
date, it is arguable that they tend to vote accord-
ing to their expressed political affiliation. Due to
the magnitude of these numbers, overcoming the
goodwill bestowed on the Democratic and Repub-
lican Parties constitutes a substantial entry barrier
for other prospective presidential candidates."'
Moreover, the burden associated with overcom-
ing this entry barrier is even greater in the market
for votes because there is no price competition. In
the typical product market, product differentia-
tion barriers are overcome through a combina-
tion of escalated product promotion and price
competition. " 2 Because price is not a mechanism
by which presidential candidates can attract vot-
ers, the promotional element-the information
element-bears all of the weight in overcoming
this substantial entry barrier. 13 Product differen-
tiation constitutes a significant entry barrier for
presidential candidates seeking to compete in the
market for votes.
b. Ballot Access
Ballot access restrictions imposed by state law
have also served as a barrier to entry in the market
for votes. Most states provide automatic ballot ac-
cess to parties that received a certain percentage
or number of votes in the previous general elec-
109 NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES, THE NES GUIDE TO PUB-
LIC OPINION AND ELECTION BEHAVIOR: PARTY IDENTIFICATION
7-POINT SCALE 1952-1958, available at http://www.umich.
edu/-nes/nesguide/toptable/tab2aj 1.htm (last visited Mar.
12, 2001) (graphing the results of surveys conducted at two-
year intervals from 1954 to 1998 that assess the degree of at-
tachment those surveyed have to different political parties)
(noting that 19% of those sampled were strong Democrats
and 10% of those sampled were strong Republicans in 1998);
see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 299 (1999) (depicting the results of surveys
conducted at two-year intervals from 1972 to 1994 that as-
sesses the degree of attachment those surveyed have to differ-
ent parties).
110 See generally ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 19.
I1 See generally id.
112 Id. at 19.
113 See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
1"4 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-804 (West 2000) (re-
quiring 5% of vote in previous election for automatic ballot
access); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-1-101(16) (A) (Michie 2000) (re-
quiring 3%); see also Bradley A. Smith, Judicial Protection of Bal-
tion. 11 4 Because the two major parties tradition-
ally satisfy these requirements, the restrictions ef-
fectively give them automatic general election
ballot access while excluding the other candi-
dates.11 5 Candidates outside the two dominant po-
litical parties often fail to meet the requirements
for automatic ballot access.'l 6 Consequently, mi-
nor party candidates must use their already lim-
ited resources to gain ballot access by way of a
nominating petition."17 Typically, a nominating
petition scheme requires that candidates solicit a
pre-determined number of signatures from regis-
tered voters offering support to the candidate." 18
This process is made more difficult by procedural
restrictions also imposed by state law. For exam-
ple, in some states, persons voting in a major po-
litical party primary are prohibited from signing a
petition declaring support for another presiden-
tial candidate.' ' These restrictions undermine
the legitimacy of minor party candidates as viable
voting consumers by making it disproportionately
difficult for them to gain ballot access and further
entrenching the two major party candidates.
c. Access to Debates
The Commission of Presidential Debates has
created an additional barrier to entry by requiring
that presidential candidates have at least 15% sup-
port from the national electorate before being al-
lowed to participate in the presidential debates.
120
As stated earlier, information is the critical variable
when assessing non-price competition among the
lot-Access Rights: Third Parties Need Not Apply, 28 HARv. J. ON
LEGIS. 167, 175 (1991) [hereinafter Smith] (citing ballot ac-
cess restrictions).




119 See, e.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 181.006 (Vernon
1990); see also Smith, supra note 114, at 177. In the context of
a product market, this practice would be condemned as an
illegal boycott or tying arrangement. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (holding a de-
partment store chain liable for an illegal boycott when it con-
ditioned its purchase of appliances on the producers' prom-
ise not to sell its appliances to a small single store retailer);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451,
461-62 (1992) (defining an illegal tie as "an agreement by a
party to sell one product but only on condition that the
buyer... agrees that he will not purchase that product from
another supplier").
120 CANDIDATE SELECTION CRITERIA, supra note 98.
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presidential candidates in the market for votes be-
cause it is the basis upon which voters (who face
no pricing mechanism) make their voting deci-
sions.12' By denying voters access to information
about minor candidates, who might otherwise ap-
pear in the presidential debates, the CPD makes it
more difficult for minor party candidates to en-
gage the major parties in non-price competi-
tion.'22 Because non-price competition is the only
means for presidential candidates to compete in
the market for votes, the exclusion of minor can-
didates from the presidential debates essentially
prevents them from entering the market at all.
123
In the context of a product market, this entry bar-
rier would be similar to a high capital outlay re-
quirement that is necessary for efficient entry.
124
Figure 1 depicts this barrier graphically. The
vertical axis measures different amounts of
money. The horizontal axis depicts quantity of
votes. Curve MC depicts a hypothetical marginal
cost curve.125 At any given point on the curve, MC
represents the additional information dissemina-
tion cost that will be incurred by a hypothetical
presidential candidate in acquiring one addi-
tional vote. 126 By requiring a "nonpartisan" candi-
date to earn at least 15% support before being al-
lowed to participate in the presidential debates,
that candidate must expend a dollar amount
equivalent to P* where Q* is the number of votes
constituting a 15% support level.
In the market for votes, there are a small num-
ber of consumers controlling a majority of the
consumption resources 27 and high entry barri-
ers. 1 28 Therefore, this market resembles an
oligopsonistic marketplace. 129 Based on this con-
clusion, economic theory mandates that con-
sumption resources will not be responsive to pro-
121 See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
122 See generally id.
123 See generally id.
124 See ANTITRUST ANALYsIs, supra note 3, at 18-19 (defin-
ing capital requirements as an entry barrier resulting from
the combination of expensive start-up costs and slow accept-
ance by consumers).
125 See generally SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at
115-22 (discussing the relationship between production and
cost).
126 Id. at 116-17 (defining marginal cost as the addi-
tional cost of producing one extra unit of output).
127 See generally TOTAL RAISED AND SPENT, supra note 88
(showing that Al Gore and George W. Bush had access to a
disproportionate amount of campaign money relative to
other candidates).





ducer (voter) preference, 130 and if the final
product market is oligopolistic, prices in that mar-
ket will be excessively high.'
3'
B. Assessing the Competitiveness of the
Marketplace for Political Influence Over the
President
In the market for political influence over the
elected president, the product being sold is a con-
tingent interest in influence over a winning presi-
dential candidate. The interest is contingent be-
cause it only comes to fruition if the candidate
supported actually gets elected.' 32 This is an im-
portant point because vote accumulation is an es-
sential element to winning an election 33 Thus,
while the consumers in this market are the people
and organizations that contribute to political cam-
paigns, 1-14 the producers must necessarily be the
same presidential candidates that were consumers
98.
129 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 308; see also
Dowd, supra note 39, at 1084-85; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 8, at 299.
130 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 320-21 (noting
that oligopsonists can exercise their market power to obtain
other advantages besides a lower price).
131 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 308; see also
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 300.
132 See TOTAL RAISED AND SPENT, supra note 88 (demon-
strating that many candidates received campaign contribu-
tions, however, only George W. Bush became president).
133 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (stating that the person
with the greatest number of electoral votes shall be presi-
dent).
134 See TRANSACrION QUERY, supra note 65; see also Mar-
cus, supra note 2, at A12 (identifying donors who have given
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in the market for votes. 135 They are the only ones
who have gained access to votes.' 1 6 This realiza-
tion allows two additional conclusions that help to
clarify the relationship between the market for
votes and the market for political influence.
First, it is the accumulation of votes supporting
an identifiable candidate that change votes from
an input into a final product.137 The distinction
between what is offered by voters in the market
for votes and what is exchanged in the market for
political influence is similar to the distinction be-
tween the whole and the sum of its parts.'13 By
combining votes and attaching them to an identi-
fiable candidate, the new product created is a
consensus. 139 The political momentum associated
with that consensus is what is sold to campaign
contributors.
Second, due to a constant stream of surveys and
polling data, the success of various consumers in
the market for votes is fairly transparent to con-
sumers in the market for political influence. 1
4
11
Therefore, the same dynamics that cause the mar-
ket for votes to be oligopsonistic also cause the
market for political influence to be oligopolis-
tic. 14 1 The same forces that prevent minor party
presidential candidates and potential entrants
from attracting voters in the market for votes 142
also prevent presidential candidates from selling
an interest in a winning presidential candidate in
the market for political influence. 143 If a given
producer cannot accumulate votes in the input
market there is no winning candidate to sell in
the output market.1
44
Finally, there is an additional entry barrier to
the market for political influence. As mentioned
earlier, the 15% national support requirement
creates an artificial entry barrier in the form of an
escalated capital requirement. 45 Similarly, the
fact that consumers in the market for political in-
fluence have a demand for winning presidential
candidates creates a similar but much larger capi-
tal requirement. 14 Figure 2 portrays this burden
graphically. MC is a hypothetical marginal cost
curve. Q is the minimum number of votes neces-
sary to win the election under an Electoral Col-
lege regime.1 47 Q is the minimum number of
votes necessary to win under a popular vote re-
gime. 1 48 Assuming that all points on MC re-
present the additional information dissemination
cost of acquiring one more vote, P and P' re-
present the corresponding cost of acquiring a suf-
ficient amount of votes.
more than one million dollars in soft money during the 2000
campaign cycle); Top DONORS, supra note 65 (assessing top
individual, organizational and business sector donors).
'35 See ANTITRUSTI ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 18 (explain-
ing that where current firms control an essential raw mate-
rial, new entry is impossible).
136 See 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS, supra note
60 (listing the amount of votes each candidate received by
state); see also ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 18.
'37 See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 21 (concluding
that an aggregate blanket license of copyrighted musical
compositions, which gives the licensee unlimited access to
thousands of individual compositions, is a separate product
from a license to nse one individual composition); id. at 22
(describing licenses for individual musical compositions as
raw materials in producing aggregate blanket license).
138 See id. at 21-22.
139 See id. at 21.
140 See, e.g., Keating Holland, Poll: Gore, Bush Still Lead in
Support for Presidential Nomination, CNN.COM, at http://
www.cnn. . .. 000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/0 I / I 2/voter.poll/
(last visited Jan. 27, 2001) (comparing voter satisfaction if Al
Gore or Bill Bradley received the Democrat presidential
nomination and if George W. Bush orJohn McCain received
the Republican nomination).
141 See ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 18 (explain-
ing how blocked access to raw materials can serve as a barrier
to entry into the final product market).
142 See, e.g., CANDIDATE SELECTION CRITERIA, supra note
98.
143_ See ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 18.
144 Id.
145 See CANDIDATE SELECTION CRITERIA, supra note 98; see
also ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 18-19.
146 See generally ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 19
(defining capital reqtirements as an entry barrier resulting
from the combination of expensive start-up costs and slow
acceptance by consumers).
147 See Thomas M. Durbin, The Anachronistic Electoral Col-
lege, 39 Fed. B. News &J. 510 (1992) [hereinafter Durbin]
(explaining that it is possible for a candidate to win the elec-
toral college vote but lose the popular vote). See generally U.S.
CONsT. amend. XII (mandating that the president be elected
under an electoral college system); FEDERAL ELECTION COM-
MISSION, DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTORAL VOTES (2000), available
at http://www.fec.gov/pages/elecvote.htm (last visited Jan.
26, 2001) (listing the distribution of electoral votes by state
for the periods 1981-1990 and 1991-2000).
148 See Durbin, supra note 147, at 510 (explaining that it
is possible for a candidate to win the electoral college vote,





Ultimately, because there are a small number of
producers controlling votes 149 and high producer
entry barriers,1 5 ° the market for political influ-
ence is oligopolistic.1
5 1
Based on the application of economic theory to
the presidential election process, it appears that
the market for votes is oligopsonistic and the mar-
ket for political influence is oligopolistic. Eco-
nomic theory further predicts that resources will
not be responsive to voter preference in the mar-
ket for votes1 52 and prices will rise to supra-com-
petitive levels in the market for political influ-
ence.153 Because these conditions have been
shown to exist, 154 economic theory is a useful tool
in explaining the current status of our presiden-
tial election process. 15 5 Thus, economic analysis-
as it is applied under our antitrust laws to our
product markets-should be employed, by anal-
ogy, to our marketplace of ideas to reform the
presidential election process and scrutinize elec-
tion legislation under the First Amendment.
149 See generally TOTAL RAISED AND SPENT, supra note 88
(demonstrating that George W. Bush and Al Gore had access
to a disproportionate amount of campaign money relative to
other candidates); ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 18
(explaining that where current firms control an essential raw
material new entry is impossible).
150 See, e.g., CANDIDATE SELECTION CRITERIA, supra note
98.
151 See supra note 25.
152 See generally Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 320
(noting that oligopsonists can exercise their market power to
obtain other advantages besides a lower price). Economic
theory also suggests that resources will be responsive to con-
tributor preference in the market for political influence.
153 See generally Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at 308;
Based on the preceding reasoning, antitrust
analysis and economic theory can be used by both
the judiciary and legislature to reform the presi-
dential election process.
A. Ballot Access Restrictions
Several states have adopted laws that prohibit
voters who participate in a political party primary
from signing nominating petitions that would en-
able third party candidates to gain general elec-
tion ballot access.1 56 For example, in Texas, nomi-
nating petitions must be accompanied by the
following language: "I have not voted in a primary
election or participated in a convention of an-
other party during this voting year, and I under-
stand that I become ineligible to do so by signing
this petition."'157 Using the analysis suggested by
this article, this restriction and other ones like it
should be invalidated by the First Amendment be-
cause they are inconsistent with the theory of the
marketplace of ideas.
In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,' 58 an anti-
trust case, an agreement between Broadway-Hale,
the owner of a chain of department stores, and
several appliance producers was challenged as vio-
lating the Sherman Antitrust Act.'59 The Supreme
Court found that Broadway-Hale had used its
"monopolistic buying power" to induce an agree-
ment that prohibited the appliance manufactur-
ers from selling its products to Klor's, a single
store retailer that competed with Broadway-Hale
in San Francisco. 11 The Court held that the
agreement deprived the appliance producers of
their freedom to sell to Klor's and was an illegal
concerted refusal to deal.161
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 300.
154 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
155 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 60, at 895 (noting
that the ultimate test of an economic model is its predictive
ability).
156 See, e.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 181.006 (Vernon
1990); see also Smith, supra note 114, at 176.
157 TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 181.006(f).
158 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
159 Id. at 208.
166 Id. at 209; see also Blair & Harrison, supra note 39, at
320-21 (identifying Klors as an example of how a monop-
sonist can use its buying power to impose non-price restric-
tions).




The Texas law restricting ballot access is analo-
gous to the agreement invalidated in Klor's. Presi-
dential candidates are essentially buyers of
votes. 16 2 As shown earlier, the Republican and
Democratic Party candidates possess a predomi-
nant share of the consumption resources in the
market for votes.'"! Like the agreement in Klor's,
the Texas law enables Republicans and Democrats
to use their buying power to restrict the voters'
decisions regarding the party candidates with
which they will deal. 164 The law forces the produc-
ers of votes to boycott third-party nominating peti-
tions or lose the opportunity to participate in the
selection of buyers (or presidential candidates)
who will represent the Republicans and Demo-
crats in the general election. Employing the rea-
soning found in Klor's by analogy, courts should
invalidate the Texas law restricting ballot access
and those like it because these laws are inconsis-
tent with the First Amendment theory of the mar-
ketplace of ideas. 165
B. The CPD's Fifteen Percent National Support
Requirement
Under the reasoning suggested by this article,
the CPD's 15% national support requirement also
fails to comply with the First Amendment. This re-
striction is analogous to the one imposed in Allied
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head Inc.166 In that
case, the National Fire Protection Association, a
private voluntary organization, published fire
safety standards that were extremely influential
and often routinely adopted into law.11 7 The
plaintiff submitted its polyvinyl conduit for the as-
sociation's approval as a safe alternative to steel
conduit.168 When approval was before the associa-
tion, the steel interests recruited 230 people to
vote against the plaintiffs proposed alternative to
steel conduit. 1'"- Plaintiff sued under Section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act alleging that the steel
162 See 2000 PRESIDENTIAl. ELECTION RESULTS, supra note
60 (listing the amount of votes each candidate received by
state).
163 TOTAL RAISED AND SPENT, supra note 88.
164 See Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S at 213; see also TEX. ELEC. CODE
ANN. § 181.006(f).
165 TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 181.006(f).
166 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
167 Id. at 495.
168 Id. at 496.
169 Id. at 496-97.
170 Id. at 497-98.
interests had conspired to prevent inclusion of
the polyvinyl conduit within the safety stan-
dards. 
170
The Court in Allied Tube began its analysis by
defining the relevant context of standard setting
as a private association. 171 The Court then noted
that there was "no doubt" that the members of
such associations have incentives to restrain com-
petition. 172 In responding to the argument that
the association's activity was "quasi-legislative" and
therefore immune from antitrust scrutiny, the
court relied on the fact that association members
eligible to vote were not accountable to the public
and were also personally interested in the out-
come of the association's votes.' 73 The Court held
that the association could not "bias the [standard-
setting] process by, as in this case, stacking the
private standard-setting body with decision-mak-
ers sharing economic interest in restraining com-
petition." 174
The facts surrounding the CPD are the same as
those in Allied Tube. The CPD is a private, volun-
tary, bi-partisan organization that has created
standards for participation in the presidential de-
bates.175 As in Allied Tube, failure to meet the ap-
proval of the commission results in exclusion
from the presidential debates and defacto inability
to compete in the market for votes.' 76 By analogy
to the reasoning found in Allied Tube, the CPD's
15% national support requirement should be in-
validated under the First Amendment as inconsis-
tent with the theory of the marketplace of ideas.
C. Campaign Finance Reform
Ideally, the election process serves as a forum in
which different ideas compete for the electorate's
approval. Using the economic tools discussed in
this article, this can best be accomplished by fix-
ing the amount of money that various presidential
candidates use in their campaigns.1 77 By fixing
171 Id. at 500.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 501-02.
174 Id. at 511.
175 COMMISSION HISTORY, Supra note 98.
176 COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, DEBATE His-
TIORY, available at http://www.debates.org/pages/debhis.html
(last visited Mar. 11, 2001) (showing that the winning presi-
dential candidate has been a debate participant in every pres-
idential election since 1956).
177 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (concluding that the NCAA's hori-
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this amount at a level attainable by multiple can-
didates, more candidates will be able to compete
meaningfully in the market for votes.178 Further-
more, these presidential candidates will be forced
to compete on the merits of their ideas.' 79 This
will cause the market for votes to behave more
like a competitive market where output is maxi-
mized, costs are minimized and productive re-
sources are expended based on actual voter pref-
erence.' 80 It will discipline candidates to expand
the number of votes they consume by becoming
more efficient-reducing the cost per vote. 8 1 In
the context of non-price competition, a firm does
this by responding to consumer preference.'
8 2
Figure 3 articulates these ideas graphically.
Holding campaign expenditures equal and assum-
ing that the level of information dissemination is
equal,18 3 an idea offered by a presidential candi-
date that tracks voter preference more closely will
solicit more votes than a less appealing idea of-
fered by another candidate. Figure 3 demon-
strates:
By fixing campaign expenditures at P* presi-
dential candidates can expand voter consumption
only by increasing their efficiency. 184 Holding eve-
rything else equal, the ideas offered by the presi-
dential candidate with MC' cost curve are more
popular than the ideas advocated by the candi-
date with MC cost curve. 185 This mechanism en-
sures that the candidate with the most popular
ideas wins the election.'
8 6
It can be argued that this proposal is contrary
to the Supreme Court's holding in Buckley v.
Valeo.l 7 There the Court said, "the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some ele-
ments of our society in order to enhance the rela-
zontal price fixing restraints were essential elements in ensur-
ing the availability of its product and widening consumer
choice and therefore, may actually enhance market-wide
competition).
178 See, e.g., id.
179 ANTITRUST ANALYsIs, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that
perfect competition caters to consumer tastes).
180 See id. at 7 (indicating that competitive forces gener-
ate not only productive efficiency but also allocative effi-
ciency, whereby resources flow away from the production of
goods that are valued less by consumers and toward the pro-
duction of goods that are valued more by consumers); see also
SAMUELSON & NoRDHAUS, supra note 4, at 36 (noting that per-
fect competition results in an efficient allocation of re-
sources).
181 See ANTITRUST ANALYsis, supra note 3, at 6-7.
182 Id. at 8.
183 Each candidate has an equally effective way of dissem-




tive voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment, which was designed to secure the
widest possible dissemination of information.' ' 88
There is no doubt that this is the current law.
However, an analogous rule existed in antitrust
law until it was overruled.
In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,' 89 the
issue was whether a vertical non-price restraint
whereby a manufacturer gave its distributors ex-
clusive selling territories violated the Sherman
Antitrust Act.' 90 The manufacturer argued that its
distribution plan enabled it to compete more ef-
fectively with its competitors by promoting sales,
increasing the stability of its dealer outlets, and
augmenting profits. 19' Accepting these justifica-
tions as true, the Court still held that the chal-
lenged arrangement was a per se' 92 violation of § 1
of the Sherman Act because it decreased in-
184 See generally SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 4, at
138 (emphasizing that in a perfectly competitive marketplace
individual firms are price-takers); ANTITRUST ANALYsis, supra
note 3, at 21 (noting that the survival of the perfect competi-
tor depends on its ability to utilize the lowest cost production
function). In this context, a candidate's efficiency is in-
creased when he or she is able to gather more votes for the
same amount of money.
185 See generally supra note 179.
186 Id.
187 424 U.S. 1, 55 (1976) (holding that the ceiling placed
on overall campaign expenditures by § 608(c) of the Federal
Election Campaign Act violated the First Amendment).
188 Id. at 48-49.
189 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
190 Id. at 367.
191 Id. at 374-75.
192 Restrictions are per se illegal when they have a high
propensity for anticompetitive effect and low propensity for
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trabrand competition-competition between the
exclusive dealers selling the same brand. 1  1
Similarly, in Albrecht v. Herald Co.,' 9 4 the issue
was whether a vertical maximum price restraint vi-
olated the antitrust laws.' 95 The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit had held that the re-
straint was necessary to prevent the
manufacturer's dealers from reaping supra-com-
petitive prices within their exclusive territories.' 96
In dicta, the Supreme Court said that thisjustifica-
tion would be insufficient to save the restraint
from per se illegality because of the foreclosure of
intrabrand competition. I97
These cases represent the quantitative ap-
proach to antitrust law where the general rule is
that more competition is better.'98 These cases
were overruled in favor of a qualitative approach
to antitrust analysis, which focuses less on preserv-
ing all competition and more on preserving that
competition which is most beneficial to consum-
ers. I ')'9
Continental 7. V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,200
overruled Schwinn"' and State Oil Co. v. Khan2°02
overruled Albrecht.2"3 These cases involved vertical
pro-competitive benefit. N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958). But the per se rule is only employed "once
experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the
Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will
condemn it." Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S.
332, 344 (1982). The Court has been reluctant to apply the
rule to restraints "where the economic impact ... is not im-
mediately obvious." FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S.
447, 458-59 (1986).
193 Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 375, 382.
94 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
195 Id. at 147-48.
196 Id. at 153.
197 Id. at 151-54 (suggesting that the restraint at issue
potentially injured the public because it foreclosed competi-
tion within a single product).
198 Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A
Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA. L. REv. 143, 148 (1997) (cit-
ing Albrecht and Schwinn, as cases where the Supreme Court
sided with the Populists); see id. at 155-56 (explaining that
under the Populist view, the antitrust laws were intended to
protect the process of competition even if that meant prohib-
iting practices that were efficient).
'9 See id. at 153-54 (explaining that inder the Chicago
School's approach to antitrust law, the purpose of the Sher-
man Act is to maximize consumer welfare); see also id. at 147
(stating "[w] here antitrust law is concerned, the only dispute
is over just how complete the Chicago victory has been.");
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 116 (explaining that
the Populist's antitrust goals have the problem of incoher-
ence while the neoclassical model provides a set of coherent
answers to the most central questions of antitrust policy).
206 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
201 Id. at 58 (stating that the per se rule articulated in
non-price 20 4 and price restraints, 2115 respectively.
In upholding both arrangements, the Supreme
Court noted that vertical restraints reduce the
quantity of intrabrand competition. 20 6 However,
the Court also recognized the countervailing ben-
efits offered by the restraints to interbrand com-
petition."1 7 In both cases, the Court concluded
that since qualitatively, interbrand competition of-
fered a greater benefit to consumers, the loss ac-
cruing from the quantitative decrease in in-
trabrand competition could be outweighed by the
increase in interbrand competition.
21 8
Incorporating this wisdom into First Amend-
ment analysis of the election process by analogy, a
ceiling on campaign expenditures is justified. Fix-
ing the amount of campaign expenditures cer-
tainly will reduce the quantity of information dis-
seminated from the two major parties; however,
by equalizing resources to enable additional presi-
dential candidates from outside the two major po-
litical parties to speak, individual candidates will
be forced to respond to voter preference.20 9 This




202 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
20" Id. at 7 (concluding that Albrecht should be over-
ruled).
204 Continental 7'V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 40.
205 State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 8.
206 Continental 7V., Inc. 433 U.S. at 54 (concluding that
vertical restrictions reduce intrabrand competition because
they restrict the number of producers competing for the bus-
iness of a fixed number of consumers); State Oil Co., 522 U.S.
at 14 (quoting 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335,
341-42 (1987)).
207 Continental 7V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 54 (noting that verti-
cal restrictions encourage interbrand competition by al-
lowing manufacturers to acquire greater efficiencies in their
product distribution); State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 14 (quoting
324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 341-42).
208 Continental 7 V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 58-59 (concluding
that the per se analysis, whereby a finding of reduced in-
trabrand competition was sufficient to sustain antitrust liabil-
ity, is overruled in favor of a rule of reason test that will con-
sider the benefits to interbrand competition in assessing
liability); State Oil Co., 522 U.S at 15 (emphasizing that the
primary purpose of antitrust law is to protect interbrand
competition).
209 See ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 8 (noting
that a perfectly competitive marketplace caters to consumer
preference).
210 See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101 (concluding that the
NCAA's horizontal price fixing restraints were essential ele-
ments in ensuring the availability of its product and widening
consumer choice and therefore, may actually enhance mar-
ket-wide competition). But cf Buckley, 424 U.S. at 56-57 (not-
ing that the equalization of campaign expenditures may
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Since there is no pricing mechanism in the
market for votes, it is difficult to ascertain the ap-
propriate expenditure level at which presidential
campaign spending should be fixed. One possible
limit is where a hypothetical marginal cost curve
allows a presidential candidate to accumulate
enough votes to win the election. This will provide
a corresponding expenditure level or ceiling for
campaign spending. Figure 4 demonstrates:
Figure 4
MC
As Figure 4 demonstrates, this level will be dif-
ferent depending on whether the election takes
place in an Electoral College (Q) or popular vote
regime (Q*).a1
V. CONCLUSION
Economic theory is a tool used to derive a maxi-
mum amount of social utility from a fixed amount
of resources. Because mass media is a fixed re-
source, the more reliant the election process be-
comes on the availability of mass media, the more
appropriately economic theory can be applied in
reforming that process. Antitrust jurisprudence
embodies our experience with incorporating eco-
nomic theory into legal analysis. Therefore, it pro-
vides a helpful resource in developing a frame-
work to resolve issues related to the election
process under the First Amendment. By analogy,
this framework should be used to reform the pres-
idential election process and restore vigor to our
marketplace of ideas.
Q Q*
serve not to equalize the opportunities of all candidates, but
to handicap a candidate who lacked name recognition
before the start of the campaign); due to the name recogni-
tion associated with the two major parties, making an upward
adjustment of minor party expenditure levels may speed the
transition from the current system of campaign funding to
the proposed system.
211 See Durbin, supra note 147, at 510 (noting the possi-
bility of electing a president who lost the popular vote but
won the electoral vote).
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